United States v. Saintville by unknown
2000 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-6-2000 
United States v. Saintville 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000 
Recommended Citation 
"United States v. Saintville" (2000). 2000 Decisions. 141. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/141 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2000 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed July 6, 2000 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 00-3113 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
WILNER SAINTVILLE, 
       Appellant 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 99-00157) 
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 22, 2000 
 
BEFORE: GREENBERG and BARRY, Circuit Judges, 
and OBERDORFER,* District Judge 
 
(Filed: July 6, 2000) 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
* Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, Senior Judge of the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation. 
  
       David M. Barasch 
       United States Attorney 
       James T. Clancy 
       Assistant United States Attorney 
       Federal Building 
       228 Walnut Street 
       P.O. Box 11754 
       Harrisburg, PA 17108 
 
        Attorneys for Appellee 
 
       James V. Wade 
       Federal Public Defender for the 
       Middle District of Pennsylvania 
       Daniel I. Siegel 
       Assistant Federal Public Defender 
       100 Chestnut Street, Suite 306 
       Harrisburg, PA 17101 
 
        Attorneys for Appellant 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Wilner Saintville appeals from the sentence entered on 
February 1, 2000, on his guilty plea to an indictment for 
illegal entry into the United States following his deportation 
for conviction of an aggravated felony in violation of 8 
U.S.C. S 1326(b)(2). The appeal requires us to consider the 
application of U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3(c) p.s. ("section 5G1.3") in a 
situation in which a court sentences a defendant already 
subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment for a 
separate offense. We recently dealt with this issue in Rios 
v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2000), but did so under the 
version of section 5G1.3 prior to its amendment, effective 
November 1, 1995, to its current form which the parties 
agree is applicable in this case. 
 
The germane procedural history is as follows. A grand 
jury returned the indictment for the section 1326(b)(2) 
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violation on June 23, 1999. Subsequently, on November 10, 
1999, Saintville was convicted in the Court of Common 
Pleas of York County, Pennsylvania, for possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute and conspiracy to deliver 
cocaine. On December 27, 1999, the state court sentenced 
Saintville to a custodial term of 12 to 24 years. 
 
On January 31, 2000, Saintville's case came on for 
sentencing in the district court. After originally asking for a 
downward sentencing departure, Saintville's attorney 
changed her request and asked the court to run his 
sentence on the federal charge concurrently with his state 
sentence. In support of this request she indicated that she 
had calculated that the hypothetical combined sentencing 
range, treating both the federal and state charges as having 
been prosecuted in the federal court, would have been 51 
to 63 months of imprisonment, a calculation with which the 
government did not take issue then or even now. Thus, in 
Saintville's view the state sentence adequately punished 
him for both the federal and state offenses. Moreover, in an 
attempt to justify her request for concurrent sentences, 
Saintville's attorney contended that the case was unusual 
because ordinarily sentences are "harsher" in federal than 
state courts. Thus, the state sentence imposed a very 
substantial punishment even if it encompassed the federal 
sentence. 
 
The prosecutor, however, had a different approach. His 
position was straightforward and directly to the point. He 
said that he "would simply point out that it is within the 
Court's discretion to enter this sentence consecutively or 
concurrently. If the Court does enter a completely 
concurrent sentence, that would have the effect of imposing 
no punishment for this offense in the court where it 
properly sits." App. at 23. 
 
Ultimately, after hearing extensive colloquy, including a 
statement from Saintville, the district court sentenced him 
to a 46-month imprisonment term which was at the bottom 
of his imprisonment range of 46 to 57 months. The court 
reached somewhat of a middle ground on the question of 
whether the sentence should be concurrent or consecutive 
to the state sentence, as it provided that ten months would 
be concurrent and the balance would be consecutive to the 
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state sentence. Saintville then filed a timely appeal. We 
exercise plenary review of the district court's order to the 
extent that it implicitly construed the sentencing 
guidelines, see Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d at 262, but review 
the district court's determination to impose a partially 
concurrent and partially consecutive sentence on an abuse 
of discretion basis. See United States v. Spiers , 82 F.3d 
1274, 1277 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
On this appeal, Saintville contends that in imposing the 
sentence the district court erred as a matter of law because 
it failed to consider the hypothetical combined sentencing 
range which would have been applied if the United States 
had prosecuted both the unrelated state drug offenses and 
the illegal entry offense in the district court. He cites 
section 5G1.3(c), which provides that "the sentence for the 
instant offense may be imposed to run concurrently, 
partially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior 
undischarged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable 
punishment for the instant offense." He argues that the 
Commentary to the guideline required the court to consider 
the hypothetical combined sentencing range which would 
have been applicable if both prosecutions had been in the 
district court. In his view, consideration of the hypothetical 
range would have led the district court to impose a fully 
concurrent federal sentence. 
 
In considering Saintville's argument, we recognize, as the 
government acknowledges, that section 5G1.3(c) and its 
Commentary prior to their 1995 amendment would have 
required the court to consider the hypothetical combined 
guideline range. See Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d at 263-65; 
see also section 5G1.3(c) comment. (n.3) (Nov. 1993). 
Nevertheless, we will affirm. 
 
First, we point out that there is no doubt but that the 
court was aware of the hypothetical combined sentencing 
range as Saintville's attorney set forth the range and the 
prosecutor did not challenge what she said. But there is a 
more fundamental reason why we reach our result. As we 
have indicated, section 5G1.3(c) and its Commentary were 
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amended in 1995 after the sentencing at issue in Rios v. 
Wiley so that the guideline now is in the form we have set 
forth above. See U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 535 (effective 
Nov. 1, 1995). At the time of the sentencing at issue in Rios 
v. Wiley, section 5G1.3(c) provided that "the sentence for 
the instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to 
the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to the extent 
necessary to achieve a reasonable incremental  punishment 
for the instant offenses." (Emphasis added.) Thus, in Rios v. 
Wiley, but not here, the guideline in effect at sentencing 
made clear to the court that it must consider the 
reasonableness of the sentence taking into account its 
"incremental" character. Courts repeatedly have held that 
in view of the 1995 amendment, as well as the amendment 
of the accompanying Commentary, a sentencing court no 
longer must make the hypothetical calculation 
contemplated in Rios v. Wiley. See United States v. Mosley, 
200 F.3d 218, 222-25 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Velasquez, 136 F.3d 921, 923-25 (2d Cir. 1998); United 
States v. Luna-Madellaga, 133 F.3d 1293, 1294-96 (9th Cir. 
1998). Now, as the Commentary to section 5G1.3 sets forth, 
the court, "[t]o achieve a reasonable punishment and avoid 
unwarranted disparity, . . . should consider the factors set 
forth in 18 U.S.C. S 3584 (referencing 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a)) 
and be cognizant of" the factors set forth in section 
5G1.3(c), comment. (n.3) (1998). See U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3, 
comment. (n.3) (Nov. 1998). 
 
We agree with these courts as nothing in the referenced 
statutes or Commentary requires the court to make a 
hypothetical sentencing calculation. Moreover, deletion of 
the requirement in section 5G1.3 that the court run a 
sentence consecutively to the extent necessary to achieve a 
reasonable "incremental" punishment for the instant 
offenses tends to demonstrate that section 5G1.3(c) no 
longer ties the newly imposed sentence closely to any 
undischarged term of imprisonment. 
 
While it is true that the court was quite succinct at the 
sentencing and did not explain why ten months of the 
sentence was to be concurrent and the balance consecutive 
to the state sentence, still "[n]othing in the language of 
[section 5G1.3(c)] or its Commentary requires district 
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courts to make specific findings with respect to any or all 
of the factors listed in the Commentary or [18 U.S.C.] 
S 3553(a)." United States v. Velasquez , 136 F.3d at 924. 
Here, in view of the extensive presentence report and the 
sentencing colloquy, we are confident that the court 
considered the applicable statutory sentencing factors and 
was cognizant of the germane information it needed"to 
achieve a reasonable punishment" for the offense involved 
and made its determination on that basis. See  section 
5G1.3(c). After all, as the prosecutor pointed out, if the 
court had made the sentence completely concurrent to that 
state sentence, it effectively would not have been punishing 
Saintville at all. In the circumstances, we cannot say that 
the court abused its discretion in making the sentence 
partially consecutive to the state sentence. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of conviction and 
sentence entered February 1, 2000, will be affirmed. 
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